


















RE-EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITIES FOR SPANISH MEN:
WHAT ROLE DOES THE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM PLAY?
by






We analyse the re-employment probabilities of almost 330,000 Spanish men aged 20-59
years who began a unemployment insurance (UI) spell between February 1987 and
November 1991 using data derived from the national unemployment benefit administration
database (SIPRE) and discrete time duration models with flexible baseline hazards.  We
show: (i) the level of UI benefits has a relatively small disincentive effect on re-employment
rates; (ii) re-employment exit hazards increase as UI exhaustion approaches but, again, the
effect is relatively small.  (iii) Extensions to Unemployment Assistance eligibility lowered re-
employment probabilities.  Also (iv) there are clear seasonal and cyclical effects on re-
employment rates, and (v) rates are much higher for those who enter UI from a fixed-term
employment contract rather than permanent one, and (vi) for young workers.  These results
are consistent with other research drawing attention to the impact on unemployment of
inflexibilities in Spanish labour market institutions, combined with low inter-regional
mobility and reliance by many for support via their family.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between unemployment duration and unemployment benefits is a complex
multi-dimensional one.  Five main features are highlighted by the findings of earlier micro-
econometric research.  First, there is the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
changes in unemployment benefit levels and income replacement rates.  There is consensus
that higher benefits do have a disincentive effect on unemployment probabilities, but the
effect is relatively small on average (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, for a survey).
Second, the unemployment income disincentive effect may vary with elapsed unemployment
duration.  A series of British studies has found no effect for the long-term employed.
1  Third,
there is the potential impact of limited duration of eligibility of unemployment insurance (UI).
North American research in particular has found that unemployment exit rates rise as benefit
exhaustion approaches.
2  Fourth, there is the relationship between unemployment exit rates
and elapsed duration (‘pure’ duration dependence).  This has often been found to be non-
monotonic, suggesting that it is important to use flexible specifications of the baseline hazard
function.
3  Fifth, factors associated with exits from unemployment may differ with the type of
exit.  For example, researchers have found differences between exits to full-time jobs and exits
to other jobs, and between recalls from temporary lay-offs and exits to new jobs.
4
This paper focuses on the exits from unemployment to a job by Spanish men, and
investigates the first four features of the unemployment duration-benefit relationship cited.
The impacts of seasonal and business cycle effects (less commonly studied in previous work)
are also examined.  We also draw attention to the relevance of Unemployment Assistance (UA)
benefits for assessing the impact of Unemployment Insurance (UI).
Spain has a serious unemployment problem, the worst of all OECD countries (Dolado
and Jimeno, 1997).  In the early 1970s the Spanish unemployment rate was about the same as
the OECD and EU average, about 5%, but increased dramatically to reach 21% in 1985.
After this peak the rate declined until the beginning of the 1990s, but then increased sharply
again, from 16% to reach 24% in 1994.  These figures refer to the combined rate for men and
women.  The trends for men alone are similar: see Figure 1.  Although the cyclical pattern for
Spanish unemployment is the same as the EU’s, Spanish unemployment rates have been
about double the EU average rate since about 1980.  Spain is also distinctive in the nature of
its unemployment, being a ‘low flow, high duration’ country (Layard, Nickell and Jackman,
1991, chapter 5).  Increases in its unemployment rate are more closely related to increases in
unemployment duration than to increases in inflows: see Figure 1. Hence the particular
importance of modelling unemployment exit rates for understanding Spanish unemployment
levels.  Our data cover 1987-93 and so we cannot use them to explain the sharp rise in
unemployment prior to 1985, but we can contribute to understanding of its persistence
thereafter.
<Figure 1 near here>
The contribution of this paper derives from the availability of a rich new longitudinal
data set derived by record linkage from the Spanish national Integrated Benefits System
                                                
1  See Narendranathan and Nickell (1989), Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1989), Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993b, 1995) and Nickell (1979a, b).
2 See Bratberg and Vaage (2000, Norway), Ham and Rea (1987, Canada), Katz and Meyer (1990a, USA),
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993, Netherlands), Meyer (1990, USA), Micklewright and Nagy (1996, Hungary),
Moffitt (1985, USA), and Winter-Ebmer (1998, Austria).
3 See, for example, Meyer (1990) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993a). These papers also show that the
estimated impacts of UI were relatively robust to whether or not allowance was made for unobserved
heterogeneity, given the use of a fully flexible baseline hazard function.  A similar robustness result is reported
by Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995) in their study of exit rates from teaching.
4 See Narendranathan and Stewart (1993a) and Katz and Meyer (1990b), respectively.2
administrative database (Sistema Integral de Prestaciones, SIPRE).  Fifteen cohorts of persons
beginning spells of UI receipt in the February, June and November of each year between 1987
and 1991 have been followed until either exit from UI receipt or exhaustion of entitlement up to
two years later.
5  We use information about almost 330,000 unemployment spells for men.  The
advantages and disadvantages of the SIPRE are discussed in some detail later; for the moment
it suffices to draw attention to a few features.  In particular the SIPRE is similar to the
unemployment administrative record data sets used in earlier research (see footnote 2 for
citations), though is very much larger.  It is the only Spanish source with information about UI
eligibility and previous earnings.  Also the pooled SIPRE data cover almost one full business
cycle from peak to peak, so that cyclical and seasonal factors can also be examined.  This
temporal coverage also introduces exogenous variation in benefits which facilitates
identification of potential disincentive effects.  One limitation of the data set is that it covers UI
recipients rather all the unemployed.  Since UI receipt is conditional on having some work
experience (see later for details), we cannot describe well the experience of new entrants to the
labour force or those with the highest turnover rates.
In Section 2, we briefly outline the search theoretic model and econometric methods
which underpin our analysis.  We describe the Spanish unemployment benefit system and the
SIPRE data base and the variables which we derive from it in section 3.  Our analysis of re-
employment hazard rates using hazard regressions is reported in section 4, and section 5
provides concluding comments.  An Appendix provides supplementary tables and figures.
We find that the level of UI benefits has a relatively small disincentive effect on re-
employment rates on average.  It is higher for the recently unemployed but negligible for the
long-term unemployed.  Re-employment exit hazards increase as UI exhaustion approaches
but, again, the effect is relatively small.  The total re-employment hazard (elapsed duration
incorporating time-to-exhaustion) is therefore very similar in shape to the baseline hazard
holding eligibility constant: it rises over the first four months of a UI spell and then declines
over the following 20 months.  Extensions in UA eligibility in 1989 are associated with lower
re-employment rates.  There are also clear seasonal and cyclical effects on re-employment
rates, and rates are much higher for those who entered UI from a fixed-term employment
contract rather than permanent one, and for younger workers relative to older workers.  These
results are consistent with other research drawing attention to the impact on unemployment of
inflexibilities in Spanish labour market institutions, combined with low inter-regional
mobility and reliance by many for support via their family.
2. MODELLING FRAMEWORK
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the monthly re-employment hazard rate,
hit, i.e. the conditional probability that a current UI recipient i finds another job during month
t, conditional on having remained unemployed up until the end of month t-1.  This can be
thought of as the product of the probability that he receives a job offer, pit, and the probability
that the job offered is acceptable to him, qit.
2.1 Theoretical framework
Standard job search theory provides a useful framework for discussion of the factors
influencing these probabilities.  In Mortensen’s (1977) dynamic stationary search model, for
example, each individual maximises the present value of his expected utility, where utility
depends on consumption and leisure (there is no saving).  There is a fixed wage offer
                                                
5 SIPRE data have also been used by Cebrián et al. (1996) and García Serrano (1997).  However both these
studies focused on a single cohort of UI entrants, that of June 1990.3
distribution, and a constant arrival rate of job offers for given search intensity, si.  In-work
income is equal to the (expected) wage, and out-of-work income equals the unemployment
benefit.  However benefits are paid only for a fixed duration, and eligibility is conditional on
having work experience (new entrants to the labour force or those quitting jobs voluntarily
are not eligible). Individuals choose search intensity—which influences the job offer
probability—and a reservation wage, wi with cumulative distribution F(wi), which
characterises the minimum acceptable offer.  Mortensen demonstrates that the re-employment
hazard rate is proportional to si[1-F(wi)].  The hazard hit rises with either increases in search
intensity (a rise in offer rate pit) or decreases in the reservation wage (a rise in acceptance rate
qit).
The model implies, first, that the hazard rises the closer one is to benefit exhaustion,
because si increases and wi decreases.
6  (After exhaustion the hazard is then constant, because
the economic environment does not change.)  Second, increases in the relative generosity of
UI have a two-fold impact, because not only do they raise the utility of remaining
unemployed currently, but they also increase the value of future unemployment spells.  The
former factor has the conventional disincentive effect: the increase in utility of
unemployment decreases the hazard rate (assuming consumption and leisure are
complements).  The latter factor gives rise to a potential ‘entitlement effect’: a rise in the
hazard rate for those with any current benefit entitlement or entitled workers close to
exhaustion. (But this is likely to be of second-order magnitude, given discounting of the
future.)
Models like Mortensen’s are informative about the factors associated with differences
between individuals in unemployment outflow rates at a point in time. In particular hazards
will be higher for persons with relatively high expected in-work incomes compared to out-of-
work income, and also vary with differences in leisure-consumption preference, discount
rates, etc.  And differences in labour market tightness will also play a role (via offer rate pit).
Although the Mortensen model also provides a clear prediction for each person of a
hazard rising with duration, various ‘real world’ complications suggest one should be
cautious about pre-judging the shape of the hazard over time.  First there are various non-
stationarities.  Labour market tightness can vary over the unemployment spell, by locality, by
season and with the business cycle.  On the one hand, one might expect greater availability of
jobs, and thence more job offers, to increase the re-employment hazard.  On the other hand, if
workers expect continuing future growth in job availability with the business cycle, they may
become more choosy about currently available positions.
Benefits may also vary over the spell: for example in Spain, UI payments decline with
duration (see below).  And the longer the unemployment spell is, the more likely it is that
individuals will have run down savings and other resources which might be used for job
search, so that search intensity may decline over time.  Employers may use long-term
unemployment as a signal of unfavourable worker capabilities, implying a decline in the job
offer probability with duration.  The offer probability may also decline with duration if the
worker’s human capital depreciates the longer the time out of work.  Job acceptance
probabilities may decline with duration if the receipt of benefits per se engenders further
dependence on them (along the lines of arguments of writers from the Right such as Charles
Murray).
Unemployment assistance (UA) benefits for those ineligible for UI or who have
exhausted their entitlement also complicate predictions about the re-employment hazard (and
are not incorporated in formal models).  Payments are typically made at a lower rate than UI
                                                
6  The reservation wage falls as entitlement runs out because the relative utility of unemployment declines.  This
decline raises the return to extra search and so raises optimal search intensity.4
and conditional on a family means test.  The length of entitlements also differs from UI.  One
might suppose that the higher the UA payment or the longer the entitlement, the higher the
reservation wage and the lower the hazard, with the size of the effect depending on the
generosity of UA relative to both potential in-work income and UI, and differences in
preferences for income and leisure.  One might also expect the existence of UA to affect the
shape of the re-employment hazard during UI receipt, especially close to the time of
exhaustion of UI.  For example, the hazard might fall as exhaustion approached if UA receipt
is anticipated (rather than rise as predicted in the Mortensen model).
In sum, the search framework suggests that re-employment hazards should be
modelled in empirical work as a function of expected in-work incomes, out-of-work incomes
of different types and duration, personal characteristics associated with differences in search
intensity, reservation wages, and factors associated with differences in offer probabilities,
including the availability of jobs.  Given the ambiguities about the predicted nature of the
duration dependence in the hazard, it is important not to place restrictions on the shape of the
baseline hazard a priori.
2.2 Empirical modelling framework
In this paper we follow most of the previous literature and model the re-employment
hazard using a reduced-form specification.
7  Models are fitted by maximum likelihood
methods, with the log likelihood function specified in the following manner.
The probability of observing an incomplete spell of length di months for person i is
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where ci is an indicator variable equal to 1 if person i’s spell is completed and equal to 0 if it
is censored.  If one defines an indicator variable yit = 1 if person i gets a job in month t, and yit
= 0 otherwise, then the log-likelihood in (3) can be re-written as:











This expression has the same form as the log-likelihood function for regression analysis of a
binary dependent variable, in this case yit, and where the unit of observation is now the
person-month rather than the person.  Thus one can estimate the model using standard
software applied to a re-organised data set in which each person contributes as many ‘data
rows’ as he is observed at risk of exit from UI (Allison, 1981; Jenkins, 1995).
We parameterise the discrete monthly re-employment hazard for person i in month t
as
                                                
7 Cf. the structural model of, for example, Narendranathan and Nickell (1989).  But see also Atkinson and
Micklewright who argue persuasively that ‘reduced form models provide a much greater degree of flexibility
which can be used to handle important institutional details of benefit systems (1991, p. 1708).5
hit = 1/(1+exp[-(xit′ β  + γ t)]), (5)
where xit is a vector of independent covariates which potentially vary with time (calendar
time or duration)—discussed in detail in the next section—and β  is a vector of parameters to
be estimated.  No restrictions are placed on the shape of the baseline hazard: it can take on
different values, as summarised by month-specific parameter γ t. Later we also introduce
interactions between covariates and duration, using a specification of form
hit = 1/(1+exp[-(xit′ β  + zit′ ι γ t)]), (6)
where zit includes a constant term and a subset of the covariates in xit, and ι is a vector of ones
of the same length as zit.
Equations 5 and 6 are logistic hazard specifications, and have been used before by, for
example, Nickell (1979), Narendranathan and Stewart (1993b), and Bover et al. (1998).  We
choose it primarily because it makes estimation feasible using our very large data set.
A popular alternative specification for the hazard is the complementary log-log one,
yielding a model which is the discrete time representation of the continuous-time proportional
hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Meyer, 1990).  Because hit is relatively small in
practice, the logistic specification provides a very close approximation to this alternative
model.
8  That is,
ln(hit) ≈  xit′ β  + γ t (7)
to a close approximation.  Thus absolute differences in x imply proportional shifts in the
hazard, and the estimated coefficient on a covariate which is measured in logarithms may be
interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard with respect to that variable.  The monthly sequence
of values for γ t characterise the baseline hazard function common to all persons.
We also estimated some models incorporating either a Gamma mixture distribution
(Meyer, 1990, as implemented in Jenkins, 1997), or a Normal mixture distribution.  We never
found the heterogeneity variance to be statistically significant, and all other parameter
estimates were very similar to the corresponding ones in models excluding unobserved
heterogeneity.  (Bover et al. (1998) also found that the re-employment hazard rates in Spain
changed little in a model which controlled for unobserved heterogeneity.)  Moreover
estimation routines of the mixture models required about a week to converge.  We therefore
concentrate on the models without unobserved heterogeneity.
3. THE SPANISH UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SYSTEM AND THE SIPRE DATA
There are two types of unemployment benefit in Spain: unemployment insurance (Sistema
contributivo) and unemployment assistance (Sistema asistencial).  The regulations were
changed for those entering unemployment in 1992 and thereafter.
9  The post-1992 UI rules do
not apply to our sample (the latest cohort entered UI in November 1991).  However changes
in UA over the period were relevant to many in the sample, and we would expect it to affect
their re-employment behaviour.
3.1 Unemployment insurance (UI, pre-1992 system)
UI was paid to employees (excluding civil servants and domestic workers) who did
not quit their job voluntarily, and who have paid a minimum number of contributions.
Contributions for at least 6 months over the last 48 months were required for eligibility.
                                                
8 This was verified in preliminary analysis.  All estimates were derived using Stata 6.0 on a Unix Sun Solaris
workstation with 750mb RAM installed.  Estimation of the logistic models took between 40 and 120 minutes
(depending on the number of covariates), whereas estimation of each proportional hazards cloglog model took
about one day.
9 Our description is compiled from Blanchard et al. (1995), Bover et al. (1998), Cebrián et al. (1996), and
Toharia (1997).6
Length of entitlement depended on the number of months contribution made, according to a
schedule shown in Table 1.
The amount of UI paid was equal to a fraction π  of the average of the ‘regulatory
base’ in the last six months prior to unemployment, where the ‘regulatory base’ is the gross
earnings used to calculate UI contributions.  UI receipts were exempt from income tax (until
1994). UI payments decline the longer the unemployment spell is: pre-1992, π  equalled 80%
during months 1-6 of UI receipt, 70% during months 7-12, and 60% thereafter.  Payments
were also subject to a minimum amount equal to the statutory minimum wage (SMW)—i.e.
about 40% of the average wage—and a maximum amount which varied with the number of
children the unemployed person had.  The maximum was 1.7× SMW for those with no
dependent children, 1.9× SMW with one dependent child, and 2.1× SMW with two or more
dependent children.
10
<Table 1 near here>
These rules imply that after-tax earnings replacement rates may be higher than 80%
for people who entered unemployment from jobs with low earnings (up to 100% for those
who earned the SMW).  After-tax earnings replacement rates are lower than this for those
entering unemployment from relatively high earning jobs (above about 2.5× SMW).  The
floors and ceilings in the payments introduce variation in benefits which is independent of
variations in earnings.  We exploit this to help identify benefit level effects in our modelling
(see below).
3.2 Unemployment assistance (UA)
Two types of worker were eligible for UA.  The first group—not members of our
sample, by definition—comprised unemployed workers with more than 3 but fewer than 6
months of UI contributions (cf. Table 1).  The second and larger group comprised those who
had exhausted their UI entitlements.  (Between about 25% and 30% of UI entrants exhaust
their UI and go on to receive UA—see Table 2 below).  Potential UA recipients were also
required to satisfy two conditions: (i) per capita family income could not exceed the SMW
(75% of the SMW from 1993); and (ii) they had to have ‘family responsibilities’, a rather
broad concept extending to include any relative ‘of the second degree’.  For example the
beneficiary’s parents could be included (though, in 1993, the definition was restricted to
cover just a spouse and dependent children, if present).  UA was paid at a rate of 75% of the
SMW, generally for up to six months, renewable up to 18 months, depending on work
experience.
There were three special cases of potential UA recipient relevant to our analysis.
First, unemployed workers over the age of 52 or older who met all the requirements for
retirement pension receipt were eligible to receive UA until retirement age.  Hence arguably a
finding that re-employment probabilities for this group are lower than for younger men may
be (in part) interpreted as a UA disincentive effect.  Second, casual agricultural workers in
Andalucía and Extremadura were eligible for a special scheme under which UA-days were
paid according to the number of minimum contribution-days made (above a minimum).  We
                                                
10  The main changes to the UI system rules since 1992 have been an increase in the minimum contribution
period and change in the duration of entitlement.  A minimum of 12 months contributions during the previous
72 months is now required (rather than 6 in 48). The duration of entitlement is now equal to twice the modulus
of the number of contribution months divided by 6, up to maximum of 24, i.e. the potential entitlement periods
are 4,6,8,10,...,24 (rather than 3,6,9,...,24 as before). The fraction π  is now reduced to 70% over months 1-6 of
UI receipt; and is 60% thereafter.  In 1994, UI was made subject to tax, and the minimum payment reduced to
75% of SMW unless the beneficiary has dependent children in which case it remains 100% of SMW.  Prior to
1992, social security contributions were paid to UI recipients to enable them to accrue retirement pension rights;
since 1994 the unemployed have paid a small fraction of these contributions.7
cannot identify this effect directly with our data set.  (UA eligibility is not observed.)  Third,
UA eligibility was extended in 1989 for workers over 45 (see Bover et al 1998, Table A2
p39).  We use a time-dependent variable interacting age and date in our models to capture the
effect, expecting the extension of eligibility to lower re-employment probabilities.
3.3 The Spanish unemployment benefit system: assessment
Over the period this paper is concerned with, the Spanish UI system was relatively
generous in absolute terms (though generosity clearly falls with duration), and UA is less
generous than UI.  UI in Spain also appears to have been relatively generous relative to other
EU and OECD countries.  This is suggested by the cross-country analysis by the OECD
(1991) of gross replacement rates for ‘average production worker levels of 1988 earnings’ for
a new entrant to UI.  Of the countries considered, only Denmark, Sweden and the
Netherlands had similar or higher rates to Spain (OECD, 1991, p. 201).  Spanish UI coverage
is also good from a cross-national perspective: Blanchard et al. report that ‘along with France,
Holland, Belgium and Germany, Spain had the highest gross coverage rate in the EU in 1992’
(1995, p. 135).
11
Another relevant factor is the relatively non-stringent requirements for job search
during UI spells.  Signing-on to confirm unemployment status is required in person, but only
every 3 months (OECD, 1991, p. 214). Blanchard et al. state also that ‘individuals that
repeatedly turn down [job] offers retain their rights to continue to continue claiming
unemployment benefits, which clearly acts as a disincentive for leaving unemployment’
(1995, p. 135).  This is plausible, though arguably both features of the UI system may also be
a response to prolonged high unemployment rather than a cause.
4.  THE SIPRE DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
4.1 The SIPRE data
The data we use were produced by the public agency which administers the payment
of unemployment benefits, the National Institute of Employment (Insitututo Nacional de
Empleo, INEM).  Computerisation of their records has enabled longitudinal linkage of
records from monthly payroll computer files for all fully unemployed workers (men and
women), as well as some others, for example on short-time working.  At present, and a
reflection of the administrative purposes for which the SIPRE was designed, one cannot
easily derive for each unemployed person a complete history containing all spells of UI and
UA.  The data set available to us contains information about one UI spell per ‘fully
unemployed’ beneficiary (data for the workers who entered the database because of
temporary layoff or short-time working were not available).
12
More specifically, the data comprise fifteen 40% random samples of all the fully
unemployed persons who began a UI spell in each of February, June, and November during
the five years 1987-1991 inclusive.  The data may, in principle, contain multiple spells for the
                                                
11 Toharia (1997) provides more information about coverage using both benefit administration and labour force
survey data.  For the period considered in this paper, 1987-1993, Toharia shows that there was a distinct
increase in coverage for both men and women.  For example, the number of men receiving unemployment
benefits (either UI or UA) expressed as a proportion of all unemployed men with work experience (i.e. those
eligible for unemployment benefits), rose from about 37% in 1987 to about 47% in 1992 (Toharia, 1997, p.
159).  Coverage peaked in 1992, and declined to 1987 levels by 1996.
12 These and other extracts from the SIPRE data were originally derived for a team at the Universidad de Alcalá
to which García-Serrano belongs.8
same person, though we cannot observe this from the data.  (The chances of this occurring are
reduced by the work experience requirement for UI eligibility.)
The variables which are available directly from the administrative records are:
•   Personal data: sex and date of birth, number of children, whether the claimant has ‘family
responsibilities’ (as defined above), and the autonomous region where the benefit is paid
(a close proxy for place of residence).
•   Last job: the ‘regulatory base’ (former earnings, as defined above), contribution period,
former job type.
•   Benefits: type of benefit (UI in this case), dates of claim start and end, eligible entitlement
period, elapsed duration of current receipt (in days), the reason for entering
unemployment, and the reason for exiting the system.
Some variables which we would like to have are not collected, for example, educational
attainments (though there are some elements of this in ‘former job type’), marital status, and
more details about the last job such as industry, firm size etc., or redundancy payments
received (which might be used to subsidise job search or self-employment) but, on the other
hand, their receipt is likely to be captured by the fixed-term contracts indicator variable.
Our analysis sub-sample comprises men aged 20-59 years with consistent non-
missing data on regression covariates.  The lower age limit aims at excluding young people
just starting their work careers who may also be making educational choices, and the
maximum age limit aims at excluding those whose decisions may be influenced by retirement
considerations.  We defer the analysis of women’s unemployment duration to another paper.
Our sub-sample excludes men with benefit data containing obvious measurement errors (for
example elapsed durations or entitlements inconsistent with the UI rules described above).
Those with missing data on covariates were also excluded.  All these exclusions removed a
maximum of about 1% of each entry cohort.
Our analysis focuses on exits from UI to a job, and treats spells which end because of
exhaustion of entitlement or because of exit from UI for ‘other reasons’, as censored.  These
other reasons are diverse and include death, retirement, permanent disability, emigration, and
self-employment start-ups subsidised with UI.  The UI spells which end in exhaustion can
also be distinguished according to whether they were followed by a spell of UA or not.  It is
not possible to identify ex ante those who are potentially eligible for UA.
Subsample numbers and breakdowns by entry cohort and type of exit are shown in
Table 2.  The pooled sample consists of 329,947 spells, of which 27% ended because of exit
to a job.  This proportion is much smaller than the fraction of spells ending because of
exhaustion of entitlement, about 59%.  Of these, just under half the UI recipients went on to
receive UA after UI.
13  About 14% of all UI spells for ‘other’ reasons.
The breakdowns by entry cohort reveal some interesting time-series patterns.
November entry cohorts are much more likely to exhaust their UI and not to go on to UA,
relative to other entry cohorts.  They have correspondingly low proportions in the exit for
‘other reasons’ group, with the exception of 1991 when this category is relatively large for
the February and June cohorts as well.
Interesting time-series patterns in unemployment inflows are also revealed by Table 2
(recall the data represent a large sample from the inflow).  Reflecting seasonal factors, the
November samples are about 50% larger than the February and June ones in each of the five
                                                
13  How do those without UA survive financially?  The most obvious answer is: by dependence on income
sharing within their family.  Robinson (1997) puts it more bluntly in his subtitle: ‘Spain’s welfare system is let
off the hook by the family’. The incidence of single-person households in Spain is below the OECD average,
and most unemployed people live in household with at least one employed person.  Spain remains the home of
the ‘male breadwinner’ model, with relatively low labour force participation rates by wives, and a high
proportion of young adults living at home (and often unemployed).9
years.  This pattern occurs within an upward trend in inflows over the whole period
(consistent with Figure 1 which shows second quarter inflows over a longer period).
<Table 2 near here>
4.2 Derived variables
Many of the variables we use in the multivariate modelling are listed in Table 3,
together with summary statistics.
<Table 3 near here>
Exits to a job are observed in about 4% of the 2,397,685 person-months observed for
our sample. (This figure is the mean of variable yit in equation 4, the dependent variable in the
regression modelling.)  Average UI spell length is 7.3 months and average entitlement is 9.6
months.  In fact 41% of the sample were entitled to three months UI, 16% to 6 months, 9% to
9 months, 7% to 12 months, 5% to 15 months, 6% to 18 months, 5% to 21 months, and 13%
to the maximum of 24 months.
Turning now to the explanatory variables, we control for age at the start of the UI
spell using a non-linear specification, distinguishing seven age groups. Average age is 33
years.  In particular we distinguish those aged 52 or more (some 9% of the sample) given the
association between UA eligibility and age discussed earlier. About 40% of the sample have
family responsibilities (defined earlier).
14
Former job type is an administrative definition of the UI recipient’s former
occupation, though it also includes elements related to qualifications.  Almost 80% of our UI
entrants come from production jobs, about 16% from clerical jobs, and only 6% from degree
or higher technical jobs.  The large representation of production is largely because risks of
unemployment entry are lower for non-production jobs.
A notable feature of the Spanish labour market is the prevalence of fixed-term
employment contracts.  These contracts were introduced in 1984 in order to improve labour
market flexibility and imply lower firing costs (redundancy payments are lower than for
‘permanent jobs’).  The legislated minimum contract duration was 6 months, and the
maximum 3 years.  The use of fixed term contracts spread rapidly: ‘Between 1986 and 1990,
80% of all contracts registered at employment offices were fixed-term.  By 1991, fixed-term
and temporary employment accounted for nearly a third ... of total employment’ (Blanchard
et al. 1995, p. 128).  See also Alba-Ramírez (1998).  These jobs are held disproportionately
by women, youths, and those working in construction, agriculture, retail and hotel/restaurant
services.  We distinguish men whose last job before the UI spell was covered a fixed term
employment contract.  They comprise more than four-fifths (84%) of our sample (a fraction
consistent with the high proportion of men with relatively short UI entitlements).
To measure differences across persons and over time in labour market tightness we
have merged into the data set information about the quarterly all-persons unemployment rate
for each of the 17 Spanish autonomous regions over the period covered by our data, i.e.
1987:1-1993:4.  A time-series graph of these data (not shown) shows that the rates for each
region follow a shallow U-shape, but differences between regions in the level of
unemployment are large.  For example, in 1987:1 the rates ranged from 30% in Andalucía (a
poor southern region) to about 14% in La Rioja and Cataluña.  Rates subsequently fell and
were about 5 percentage points lower in most regions by the first half of 1991, but then
increased to reach 1987 levels again by 1993:4.  As we shall show, there are difficulties in
identifying an unemployment effect separately from any region effect because the
unemployment rankings of the regions are rather stable—a feature emphasised by Jimeno and
                                                
14 We used ‘number of children’ as a covariate in preliminary analysis and it was never statistically significant
given the inclusion of the family responsibilities variable. We therefore excluded it from all later models.10
Bentolila (1998) who draw attention to persistence in regional wages, participation rates and
real wage inflexibility.
We concentrate on models which include regional fixed effects, to allow for the
potential impact of other factors factors besides unemployment.  In particular recall that UA
eligibility differs by region (there is a special scheme for Andalucía and Extremadura).  We
also introduce an interaction term between residence in these two regions and UI benefits.
These regions stand out as being particularly poor and having high unemployment rates.  In
such a situation, any job offer is likely to be accepted, so that re-employment probabilities are
likely to be relatively insensitive to variations in benefits.
We include a direct measure of the business cycle, namely the quarterly growth rate
of GDP (following Bover et al., 1998).  Seasonal effects are captured by a set of dummy
variables which indicate whether a spell month is in spring (March-May), summer (June-
August), autumn (September-November) or winter (December-February).  We use a
definition of season based on climate, rather than the conventional time-series one based on
the calendar year quarter, because we believe our formulation better reflects patterns of hiring
in the Spanish labour market.  We also include year indicator variables to pick up any other
period effects which are not already accounted for the GDP growth, regional unemployment
and seasonal variables.  They may also pick some effects of the changes to UA in 1993.
Our measure of the in-work income a worker could expect to get if he took a job is the
net wage per month from the last job.  Use of this definition is common practice in studies
based on administrative record data (see e.g. Meyer 1990).  Although it has some
disadvantages, it is the only measure we have or could feasibly derive.
15  We estimate net
wages from the gross wage (‘regulatory base’) information on the files by applying the tax
rates applicable for a single person.  (This is justifiable since Spain has an independent
taxation system.)  Figures were converted to February 1997 prices using the monthly retail
price index.
A particular strength of the SIPRE data is the information about UI eligibility.  Given
the rules of the UI system, we calculated the amount due in each month of the spell (recall UI
payments vary with duration).  The resulting figures were then converted to February 1997
prices using the monthly retail price index.
Real net wages and benefits were used (in log form) as separate regressors rather than
assuming a priori that it was their ratio, the replacement rate, which was the relevant
covariate.  Nonetheless it is convenient to summarise the relative generosity of the UI system
in terms of replacement rates.  On average, gross replacement rates were 78% in the first 6
months of the spell, 67% in months 7-12, and 65% thereafter (see Table 3).  Average net
replacement rates (i.e. adjusting for taxes) are quite a lot higher: 92%, 79% and 75%
respectively.  It is also important to note that there is substantial variation about these average
figures.
Identification of UI benefit level effects separately from wage effects is possible even
though UI receipts are related to previous earnings (given the rules described earlier).  There
are two potential sources of variation providing identification in addition to the usual
functional form ones.  First the proportionate relationship between earnings and benefits does
                                                
15 Narendranathan and Stewart have argued that such a measure has ‘serious disadvantages, including its
potential endogeneity. The individuals who are more selective about selecting jobs may have had higher than
average earnings’ (1993a, p. 72; see also Nickell, 1979, p. 1252).  They follow Narendranathan, Nickell and
Stern (1989) in using a measure derived assuming that workers concentrate job search on one of 5 labour market
segments defined in terms of broad occupational groups. Expected net earnings are imputed as the wage
predicted from an occupation-specific wage regression which controls for differences in education and age,
fitted to the data of previous earnings.  Total net income is then calculated at imputed net earnings plus income
from other sources. We do not have sufficient information to be able to implement this procedure.11
not apply below the UI payment floor or above the UI payment ceiling.  These bounds are
relatively wide, however, and so the number of workers outside the cut-offs is not large.  We
would therefore emphasise the separate time-series variation in each of the two series as a
second source of identification.  (This particular advantage comes only from pooling the
entry cohorts rather than using them separately.)
We analyse the impact of time-to-exhaustion effects in the hazard using regressors
which characterise a linear spline in a variable equal to the number of months of eligible
duration minus the number of elapsed UI spell months (including the current month).  The
range of the variable is thus from 0 (for those in the last month of UI eligibility) to 23.  We
use a linear spline in order to allow a non-monotonic association with the hazard (following
Meyer, 1990, and Katz and Meyer, 1990).
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Coefficients on each spline variable show the change in the hazard associated with a
one unit change in the number of months until exhaustion over the interval between the
relevant knots.  We use 6 knots, allowing effects to differ over 7 duration intervals, i.e. time-
to-exhaustion = 0, 1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-11, 12-17, and 18-24 months.
Identification of the time-to-exhaustion effect is based on the variation in maximum
entitlements across the sample separate from the variation in elapsed duration.  This separate
variation is greatest when time-to-exhaustion is imminent (values of time-to-exhaustion of 0,
1, and 2 are observed for all UI recipients) and declines with duration.  Indeed values of time-
to-exhaustion equal to 21, 22, and 23 are only observed for the group with 24 months
potential duration; over this interval time-to-exhaustion is collinear with duration and hence
not identified.  Our formulation assumes that any potential time-to-exhaustion effect is the
same for all values of 18 months or more.
Finally, ‘pure’ duration dependence in the re-employment hazard is captured non-
parametrically, using separate indicator variables for each spell month.
We also explore whether there are variations in the effects of UI benefit levels with
elapsed spell duration and age, estimating models of the form described by (7) and using
appropriate definitions of zit to incorporate the relevant interaction variables.  Since the work
of Nickell (1979a, b), there has been a well-established result from empirical studies of
unemployment duration in Britain that unemployment benefit effects are insignificant for the
long-term unemployed.  (See also Narendranathan and Stewart 1993b.)  The rationale is that
the probability of receiving any job offer is likely to be very low and that any extra utility
which might be gained from further unemployment is also low due to stigma or the general
debilitation associated with long-term unemployment: ‘in this case, it is clear that the
reservation wage will fall to a low level even to the extent that individual will follow the
strategy of accepting the first job he is offered.  Variations in the replacement ratio will then
have no impact whatever on the probability of leaving unemployment and this is something
we might expect to pick up for the long-term unemployed’ (Nickell, 1979. p.38).
Research has also pointed out that benefit effects may be greater for younger workers.
Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern, for example, have argued for ‘the possibility that
individuals facing fairly tight (low variance) wage distributions will exhibit larger benefit
responses than those facing a much wider variation of potential wages. Younger workers are
the natural group who face tight wage distributions ...’ (1989, p. 19).
4. RESULTS
                                                
16 In preliminary analysis we also tried a quartic polynomial specification in time-to-exhaustion instead (cf. Ham
and Rea, 1989), and it gave similar results for the shape of the time-to-exhaustion hazard and virtually identical
results for the coefficients on the other covariates.12
For a first look at the data, we present Kaplan-Meier estimates of empirical hazard functions
for exits from UI to a job and for time-to-exhaustion.  These can be interpreted as estimates
of the monthly re-employment probability estimates not accounting for heterogeneity across
UI recipients.  Then we show estimates of the Kaplan-Meier cumulative failure rate function
for various subgroups of the sample.  Estimates of multivariate hazard regressions of the
hazard and discussion of their implications follow.
4.1 Empirical hazard estimates
Figure 2 displays Kaplan-Meier estimates of the empirical hazard for exits from UI to
a job derived from the pooled data from all 15 entry cohorts.  In this graph, circles show the
monthly exit hazard rates and the vertical lines through each circle span a 95% confidence
interval for the hazard estimate.  The estimates are all very precise because of the very large
sample size.
A very clear pattern is revealed.  The monthly re-employment hazard rises over the
first three months of the UI spell and then declines.  The rate of decline slows, however, as
spells lengthen.  Heterogeneity amongst UI recipients is a potential explanation for this
shape.  Imagine one group of recipients are ‘fast exiters’ with an increasing hazard and the
remainder are ‘slow exiters’ with a declining hazard.  The observed shape would then arise
because of a sorting process.  The rise in the hazard at short durations would be accounted for
by the first group, but then increasingly the hazard for the second group would determine the
shape of the overall hazard.  One of the goals of the multivariate modelling is to see whether
the shape of the hazard is the same once we have controlled for heterogeneity.
<Figure 2 near here>
There are small blips in the line traced out by the hazard line, for which UI exhaustion
effects are one potential explanation.  Observe that the hazard is slightly higher in each of
months 2, 8, 11, 20 and 21 compared to the corresponding previous month, and these are
months prior to exhaustion months (see Table 1).  But before examining the time-to-
exhaustion hazard explicitly, we shall examine the overall hazard in more detail.
For a look at potential seasonal and cyclical effects we have plotted the Kaplan-Meier
estimates of the empirical hazard for exits from UI to a job separately for each of the fifteen
UI entry cohorts.  The Figures are shown in the Appendix Figure 2A.
It turns out that each graph is similar in shape to the one shown in Figure 1: each
shows a rising hazard followed by a longer decrease.  The greatest divergence in shape from
the all-cohort hazard is for the entry cohorts of June and November 1991.  In these cases the
hazard remains more or less constant after the rise in the initial spell, rather than declining,
but then declines much more sharply in the last 6 months.  These latter spell months cover the
beginning of 1993 when a recession hit the Spanish economy.  (Note the sharp rise in
unemployment rates and average steady-state duration in 1993 shown in Figure 1.)  Other
evidence of potential cyclical effects is revealed by the general shift down in hazards over the
period, particularly in the first six months of a spell.  For example the peaks in the hazard for
1987 are well above 0.06 for 1987 cohorts, but clearly below 0.6 for 1991 ones.  A similar
downward shift in the empirical hazard has been reported by Bover et al (1998, Figure 2)
comparing 1989 and 1992.  See also Narendranathan and Stewart (1995) who report lower
hazards for Britain in a trough year (1987) compared to a peak year (1978).
There is also evidence of seasonal effects.  Given the important role of agriculture and
tourism in Spain, one would expect hazards to be higher in Spring and Summer as more
labour was taken on for the season, and lower in Autumn and Winter when demand was
lower.  The graphs in the Appendix do indeed show some upward blips in the Spring spell
months.  (For the February entry cohorts, Spring corresponds to months 2, 3, 4 and 14, 15,13
16; for the June cohorts, they are months 10, 11, 12 and 22, 23, 24; and for the November
cohorts, months 5, 6, 7, and 17, 18, 19.)
4.2 Estimates of the cumulative proportion of UI recipients exiting to a job
Table 4 shows estimates of the cumulative proportion of UI recipients exiting to a job,
with breakdowns for groups of UI recipients with different sets of characteristics.  It is
immediately obvious from the Table that unemployment durations in Spain are indeed rather
long.  Although one quarter of those beginning a UI spell had left to a job after 6 months, not
even one half (48%) had left to a job after two years since entry.
<Table 4 near here>
There are noticeable differences between some groups of recipients however. Table 4
shows, for example, that the proportions remaining on UI after 6 months were much lower
for the February and June 1991 entry cohorts—ones affected by the 1993 recession.  (This
tallies with the differences in empirical hazard functions discussed earlier.)  Differences
across cohorts in cumulative exit rates after two years are rather less marked however.
Older workers have very much smaller cumulative exit rates than younger workers
do.  After 6 months 30% of those aged less than 25 years on entry had left to job, whereas the
corresponding proportion for those aged 52 or more was only 15%.  After two years, the
differential is the same: 60% compared to 29%.
There are also very marked differences in cumulative exit rates between workers who
entered UI from a job with a fixed-term contract rather than a permanent contract.  For
example after two years, 59% of the former group had left UI to a job, but only 30% of the
latter group.  This is consistent with the differences by age (since younger workers are more
likely to have jobs with fixed-term contracts), and the multivariate analysis is required to
examine their separate effects.
There are intriguing differences by former job type.  Those who had semi-skilled
clerical or unskilled production jobs have noticeably higher cumulative exit rates.  But those
who had skilled clerical, technical or degree jobs have noticeably lower cumulative exit rates.
Insider/outsider features of the market might explain this.  Skilled clerical, technical or
degree jobs may well be ‘good jobs’, but they are hard to regain once one has lost one.
Differences in cumulative exit rates between those resident in Andalucía or
Extremadura compared to other regions, or between men with and without family
responsibilities, are not very marked.  Nor too are those between men with high and low
replacement rates in the first six months of the UI spell—prima facie evidence that benefit
effects may be small relative to other factors
4.3 Estimates of the time-to-exhaustion empirical hazard
Consider now the time-to-exhaustion empirical hazard shown in Figure 3.  Values for
months 21-23 are not shown given the problem of identification for this interval (see above).
The hazard has a rather different shape to that shown for the USA: the US hazard is relatively
flat between when there is between 4 and 52 weeks of UI entitlement remaining but then
‘jumps dramatically the week before benefits end’ (Meyer 1990, p. 766).  In Spain the hazard
is broadly U-shaped: decreasing with time when there is more than a year’s entitlement
remaining, relatively flat when there is between 6 and 12 months UI remaining, and then
increasing as exhaustion approaches.  But then it falls sharply in the last month before
entitlement runs out.  One potential explanation for the difference in US and Spanish hazard
shapes just prior to exhaustion is that UA is more widely available in Spain, and anticipation
of its receipt amongst those who are eligible reduces their UI exit hazards.  The multivariate
analysis, to which we now turn, enables us to investigate this hypothesis in more detail.
<Figure 3 near here>14
4.4 Logistic hazard regression model estimates: (i) base case
Table 5 reports the ML estimates of two logistic hazard regression models of monthly
re-employment probabilities.  Model 1 does not include regional fixed effects amongst the
regressors, whereas Model 2 does.  The estimates of the fixed effects for Model 2, and the
monthly duration dependence parameters (γ t) for both models are shown in Appendix Table
5A.  Virtually all parameter estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels,
which is unsurprising given the sample size.
We favour Model 2 over Model 1 given the very large increase in log-likelihood (900,
cf. χ
2(17, 0.01) = 33.4).  The only substantive difference between the two sets of coefficient
estimates concerns that on the (log) regional unemployment rate.   According to Model 1, re-
employment probabilities are lower if job availability is lower, as expected.  The estimated
elasticity of the hazard with respect to the unemployment rate is about –0.08.  However this
association disappears entirely once regional fixed effects are included.  The explanation was
alluded to earlier: differentials in regional unemployment rates are very persistent over time,
and so it is difficult to identify unemployment effects separately from regional effects.  This
story is supported by the pattern of coefficients on the regional fixed effects: for example
monthly re-employment rates are about 90% lower in Andalucía and Extremadura (the
regions with the highest unemployment rates) compared to those for Madrid, but about 25%
higher in La Rioja (a low unemployment region).  Differences in job availability are likely
not the full explanation however.  Recall that Andalucía and Extremadura also have a special
UA scheme (which may have a disincentive effect).  The importance of differences in
regional unemployment rates has also been found in earlier Spanish studies (though they did
not control for regional fixed effects).
We now turn to the estimates for other covariates, focusing attention on those from
Model 2.
There are very large difference in re-employment probabilities associated with age.
In particular, UI recipients aged 52+ at the start of the spell have hazards some 43% lower
than recipients aged under 25 years (-0.43 = e
-0.556-1).  On the other hand, hazard rates are
broadly similar for all those aged 30-51 years. The sharp decline in the hazard for the over-
50s is consistent with results reported by Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal (1995), Alba Ramírez
(1999), Bover et al (1996) and García Pérez (1997).
The hazard is some 10% higher for recipients who have family responsibilities
relative to those who do not.  Interpretation of this result is difficult given its non-specific
definition.  However, if one were to assume most persons with family responsibilities were
married, then there is clearer story.  Most earlier studies have found higher re-employment
hazards for married men and attributed this to positive correlations between factors favouring
marriage and employability, or to the greater pressure to get a job which greater needs might
bring.  A complementary explanation, of particular relevance to Spain, is that non-married
persons receive transfers from other family members, which raises out-of-work utility.
The results for former job type exhibit patterns consistent with those reported in Table
4 about cumulative UI exit rates. Higher exit hazards are not associated with higher skill as
one might expect.  Relative to those who had unskilled production jobs, those who had semi-
skilled or skilled production jobs, have hazards about 3% higher.  However those from
technical or degree jobs have hazards about 2% lower than unskilled production workers.
Hazards are lower for former unskilled clerical workers (-10%) and very much lower for
skilled clerical workers (by about 14%), and yet they are higher by about 12% for semi-
skilled clerical workers.  One explanation for these unexpected patterns may relate to the type
of industry these people worked in.  For example the skilled clerical category may cover
retail/hotel and other service industries, for which studies based on the Spanish Labour Force15
Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA) have shown lower hazards (Alba Ramírez,
1999; Bover et al, 1998).
The type of employment contract that the unemployed person had has a very strong
association with exit rates from UI.  Those who entered UI from a job with a fixed term or
temporary contract have a re-employment hazard more than twice as large as the hazard for
UI entrants from a job with a permanent contract.  One obvious interpretation for this
differential is that employers were more willing to take on workers on fixed-term contracts,
and previous experience of such a contract provides a positive signal to an employer about
willingness to accept such contracts.  The size of the effect found here is likely to be over-
estimate, however, and partly pick up the effects of variables not in the regressions.  Other
studies of exits from unemployment in Spain, with measures of marital status and educational
attainments in their regressions, found smaller fixed-term contract effects than we have (Alba
Ramírez, 1999, using the EPA; Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal, 1995, and Alba-Ramírez and
Freeman, 1990, using the 1985 Survey of Conditions of Life and Work (Encuesta de
Conditiones de Vida y Trabajo, ECVT)).
There are clear seasonal patterns in the re-employment hazard.  Compared to Winter’s
re-employment rates, those for Spring are about 25% higher, and those in Summer about 3%
higher.  By contrast hazards in Autumn are 5% lower than in Winter.  This pattern is
consistent with the seasonal hiring story given earlier, and with the results of Alba Ramírez
(1999) and Bover et al (1998) using the EPA, who found that Quarter 2 re-employment rates
were higher than Quarter 4 rates.
Re-employment rates are pro-cyclical.  A one percentage point rise in the quarterly
GDP growth rate is associated with a hazard some 8% higher.  There are marked period
effects in addition to those summarised by the GDP growth rate (as e.g. Bover et al. 1998 also
found).  Re-employment rates are higher in boom years and lower in recession years.
Particularly marked are the low rates in 1993, when they are some 70% lower than rates in
1987, other things equal.
The elasticity of the re-employment hazard with respect to net earnings in the former
job is 0.10.  This figure is the same sign as found in other studies, but much smaller in
absolute magnitude. For example, the elasticity in Meyer’s (1990) US study, also based on
adminstrative record data and net earnings from the former job, reports elasticities of at least
0.5.  So too do Narendranathan and Nickell (1989) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993a)
using a prospective measure of the offered wage and British data.  Put another way, despite
measuring the offer wage in different ways the US and British studies found similar
elasticities.  This suggests that the smaller Spanish estimate may be due to differences in
labour markets, i.e. the relative lack of responsiveness to the wage in Spain reflects the
greater labour market rigidities in Spain relative to the US and Britain.
<Table 5 near here>
What about the responsiveness of the re-employment probability to changes in UI
benefit levels?  We find a relatively precisely determined elasticity of -0.16.  This figure is of
the expected sign but, again, is smaller than the estimates reported in the US and British
studies cited in the last paragraph.  And again it may be the relatively greater rigidities in the
Spanish labour market which explain this. Using a standard Wald test, one can easily reject
the ‘replacement rate’ hypothesis that log benefits and log former earnings have coefficients
of equal magnitude and opposite signs.
Another potential explanation for the lower benefit elasticity in Spain may be to do
with cross-national differences in UI coverage, and it may be that receipt per se is more
relevant in the Spanish case.  For example earlier Spanish studies based on the ECVT and
EPA have reported strong negative associations between the re-employment hazard and
receipt per se of unemployment benefits (Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal, 1995; Ahn et al, 1998;16
Alba Ramírez, 1998; Alba-Ramírez and Freeman, 1990; Bover et al, 1998; García Pérez,
1997), though these studies included no measures of the amount of UI received.  Bover et al
(1998) claimed that this omission may not be so crucial, citing earlier studies by Katz and
Meyer (1990a) for example, as showing that ‘benefit duration has significantly greater effects
on unemployment duration than benefit levels (1996, p.3).  We check this conjecture shortly.
We allowed for the possibility that benefit effects may differ for UI recipients resident
in Andalucía and Extramadura.  The coefficient on the interaction variable is indeed
statistically significant at 0.18, implying a benefit elasticity little different from zero for this
group—which is consistent with our prior hypothesis.
That UA benefit eligibility can have a substantive effect on re-employment
probabilities is suggested by the statistically significant coefficient on the variable interacting
age over 45 years and spell months after April 1989.  We find that the extension of eligibility
is associated with re-employment probabilities some 7% lower.
Time-to-exhaustion effects are summarised by the linear spline coefficient estimates
in Table 5, summarised pictorially in Figure 4.
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<Figure 4 near here>
The shape of the hazard is broadly consistent with the predictions of the basic model in that it
generally rises as exhaustion approaches, at least from 18 months duration onwards.
However there are unexpected kinks very close to exhaustion, and in fact there is no
statistically significant change in the time-to-exhaustion hazard in the very last month of
eligibility.  Overall the hazard function is relatively flat, especially when one takes account of
the (pointwise) 95% confidence interval about the hazard.  In sum it appears, contrary to
Bover et al’s (1998) conjecture, that time-to-exhaustion effects are not large in Spain, at least
relative to the size of those found in North American studies (e.g. Ham and Rea, 1987,
Canada; Meyer, 1990, USA) and for the Netherlands (Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993).
Relatively small effects have also been found in other European countries (all with well-
developed UA schemes): see Bratberg and Vaage (2000, Norway), Micklewright and Nagy
(1996, Hungary) and Winter-Ebmer (1998, Austria).
The estimates of the ‘pure’ duration dependence, holding duration of benefit
eligibility constant, are shown in Appendix Table 5A, and summarised pictorially in Figure 5.
The hazard turns out to have a very similar shape to the empirical hazard shown in Figure 2
earlier, even with the multivariate controls for heterogeneity.  One difference from the earlier
picture is that the hazard peaks in the fourth month of the spell (rather than the third) before
declining at a declining rate.
There remain some small blips in hazard at months just prior to or in potential
exhaustion months (months 8, 12, 15, 20, 23), which suggests that there are some time-to-
exhaustion effects (or heterogeneity effects like work experience associated with benefit
eligibility) which are not fully captured by the time-to-exhaustion variable discussed in the
previous paragraph.  These blips are relatively small, however, and the principal impression
derived from the results is the rise in the hazard followed by decline.  Bover et al (1998,
Figure 5) using a non-parametric baseline hazard report a rise in the hazard over the first
three months of a spell followed by a decline in months 4-14. The main difference between
our results is that their predicted hazard for UI recipients is flatter than ours after the initial
peak (intriguingly it is their baseline hazard for non-recipients which has a more similar to
                                                
17  This graph and the two following are drawn for a ‘reference person’ assumed to be aged 30 years with no
family responsibilities, former job type was unskilled production, entered UI from a fixed-term contract job
eligible for 24 months UI in total, regional unemployment rate = 18%, lives in Madrid, season and year fixed at
winter 1987 values, and has mean values of log(real benefits), log (net earnings in former job), and quarterly
GDP growth (see Table 3).17
ours).  García Pérez (1997) characterises duration dependence using a fifth-order polynomial
in the logarithm of elapsed duration and finds similar results to Bover et al.
<Figure 5 near here>
The total hazard rate function, i.e. the variation in the hazard with elapsed duration
while also taking into account time-to-exhaustion effects is shown in Figure 6.  This is very
similar in shape to the elapsed duration baseline hazard function (Figure 4), which confirms
that time-to exhaustion effects, although statistically significant, appear to be relatively small
in magnitude.
<Figure 6 near here>
4.5 Logistic hazard regression model estimates: (ii) interactions between benefits and
duration
We now turn to consider whether the unemployment benefit disincentive effect
reported in Models 1 and 2, which was constrained to be common to all recipients and
invariant with elapsed duration, disguises important heterogeneity.
We first considered whether the benefit effect varied by spell month.  In terms of the
model specification summarised by (7), we included log(UI benefits) and log(earnings) in
covariate vector zit in addition to a constant term.  The estimates of the month-specific benefit
effects are shown in Table 6 in the ‘Model 3’ column.  The remainder of the parameter
estimates are shown in Appendix Table 6A.  Inclusion of the interactions changed the
coefficient estimates of other covariates very little: the models are robust.
<Table 6 near here>
The main finding is that benefit effects do indeed vary with duration, and in particular
they are non-existent for the long-term unemployed, defined as those unemployed for 18
months or more.  This is consistent with the British studies cited earlier (though ‘long term
unemployment’ in that case referred to spells of 5-6 months or more).  For spell months
before the eighteenth, the benefit elasticity is typically larger than the constant elasticity
estimated in Models 1 and 2, but nonetheless it is rather heterogeneous and not always
statistically significant (spell months 1, 3, 6, 12, 16).  It is even estimated to be positive in
month 2.
Ours is the first study for Spain to investigate duration-specific benefit elasticities.
The most closely related research is by Bover et al. (1998) who included in their model an
interaction term between log(duration) and the receipt of unemployment benefits. (Recall that
they had no measure of benefit levels in their data.)  They found that the reduction in the re-
employment hazard associated with benefit receipt decreased with duration, ‘closing up after
one year of unemployment’ (1998, p. 26).
We re-estimated Model 3 constraining the benefit elasticity to be fixed during three
month intervals: see the Model 4 estimates in Table 6.  This was in part a reaction to the
findings of statistically insignificant interaction effects, and thence an attempt to find a
compromise model in-between assuming a constant elasticity and assuming some duration-
specific variation.  As it happens a likelihood ratio test favours Model 3 rather than Model 4
(test statistic χ
2(40, d.f. = 16), p-value < 0.0001).  However this may be a reflection of the
large sample size and, in any case, the constrained model does reveal the same patterns as the
month-specific model, including the statistically insignificant benefit elasticities for the long-
term unemployed.  Since we wanted to subsequently investigate heterogeneity in benefit
effects by e.g. age, and this could only be done by reducing the number of interaction
covariates used (or else the models became too large to estimate), we work further with this
specification.
We investigated heterogeneity in benefit elasticities by age as well as elapsed
duration, by extending Model 4 to allow for age-group-specific elasticities for each of the 818
duration intervals: see Table 7.  For each of the three age groups distinguished (20-29, 30-51,
52+ years), benefit elasticities are insignificantly zero for the long-term unemployed.
Otherwise, for each age group, the elasticities fluctuate over the spell.
Effects appear slightly greater for those aged 20-29 compared to those aged 30-51.
Although the null hypothesis that the quarterly effects were the same for the two groups can
be rejected using a likelihood ratio test (χ
2(254, d.f. = 16), p-value < 0.0001), this may be a
reflection of the large sample size.  What is most striking about the results is that the
disincentive effects, where they exist, are largest in magnitude for men aged 52-59.  This is
also contrary to what one might expect (see earlier), and the patterns across age groups
certainly contrast with those found for Britain.  Narendranathan et al. (1989) and
Narendranathan and Stewart (1995), for example, found a greater benefit effect for men aged
under 20 than for prime-age men (aged 20-44) with still smaller or no effect for men aged 45-
64. Using data for 1987, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993b) found weekly benefit effects
only for teenagers.  That there are cross-country differences may not be surprising, but the
nature of the Spanish patterns is puzzling nonetheless.
<Table 7 near here>
We also investigated whether monthly UI benefit effects differed for persons with
relatively high replacement rates (over 0.90) compared to those with lower replacement rates,
but found no statistically significant differences.
5.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have provided new evidence for Spain about the determinants of re-employment
probabilities and hence unemployment duration, using a rich new data set for a very large
sample of UI recipients.  One of our main goals has been to ascertain the impact of the
unemployment benefit system, stressing that this may be manifested in several dimensions.
We have found some statistically significant impacts but they are relatively small in
magnitude.  Specifically, there are disincentive effects from higher benefit levels but these
evaporate for the long-term unemployed.  Time-to-exhaustion effects are small.  There is
some ‘pure’ duration dependence in the baseline hazard rate, but this follows a clear rise in
the hazard in the first three to four months of a spell.  The importance of considering UA
benefits for incentives, not only UI benefits, is underlined by the association between lower
re-employment rates and the extension of UA eligibility for those aged 45 years or more in
1989.  The much lower re-employment rates for those aged 52+ may reasonably also be
interpreted as an UA effect.
Noticeably larger effects on the re-employment hazard appear to be associated with
institutional features of the Spanish economy, and changes in the demand for labour, rather
than with unemployment benefits.  There are very big differentials in hazard rates according
to whether one entered UI from a job with a fixed-term or permanent contract.  This
underscores the remarks of others about the insider/outsider nature of the Spanish labour
market, with the attendant rigidities.  The relevance of labour demand effects is underscored
by the large seasonal and cyclical effects and regional differences.
In sum, our results provide further support for the conclusions of Blanchard et al.
(1995, p. 5) about what was required for a successful reduction of unemployment in Spain,
namely a sustained expansion in demand, combined with reforms to the structure of
collective bargaining and restrictions on lay-offs within the context of a social pact.  At the
margin these measures are likely to be more promising than further modifications to the
unemployment benefit system.  Our results suggesting relatively small benefit system effects19
are based on the behaviour of entrants to UI before the reductions in UI generosity introduced
in 1992, and so subsequent effects may well be smaller still.
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Figure 2.  Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard function for exits from UI to a job:
Note: vertical lines through points show 95% confidence interval for monthly hazard.  
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Table 1.  The UI entitlement period in Spain depends on
UI contributions made in previous jobs
Contribution period over the
previous 48 months  (months)
UI entitlement
(months)
  6-12   3
12-18   6





48-   24
Pre-1992 system.  See text for further details of the system
and subsequent changes to the rules.
Table 2.












1987 February 26.5 29.9 30.1 13.6   (4.8)
June 28.5 28.3 28.3 15.0   (4.3)
November 40.5 28.4 23.3   7.8   (8.9)
1988 February 26.5 27.8 31.8 13.9   (5.2)
June 28.4 26.3 30.6 14.7   (4.8)
November 37.0 25.6 27.2 10.2   (7.8)
1989 February 28.6 27.2 30.6 13.7   (5.5)
June 30.3 26.3 28.3 15.1   (5.3)
November 39.3 26.8 24.7   9.3   (8.7)
1990 February 28.2 26.8 30.9 14.2   (5.7)
June 31.4 26.8 28.6 13.3   (5.9)
November 37.6 27.4 25.1   9.9   (9.2)
1991 February 28.1 26.4 28.6 16.9   (6.8)
June 28.7 26.2 24.6 20.5   (7.1)
November 28.8 25.9 20.4 25.0 (10.2)
All cohorts combined 32.1 27.0 26.8 14.2 100
Source: authors’ calculations from SIPRE files. Total number of cases = 329,947.
Reasons for ‘other’ exits from UI include: death, retirement, permanent disability,
emigration, and self-employment start-ups subsidised with UI.25
Table 3.  Variables and summary statistics: Spanish male UI recipients aged 20-59.
mean std.dev. min max
Months of UI receipt 7.3 6.6 1 24
Months of UI receipt entitlement at spell start 9.6 7.7 3 24
Age at start of UI spell (years) 33.4 10.5 20 59
Age 20-24 0.23 0 1
Age 25-29 0.23 0 1
Age 30-34 0.16 0 1
Age 35-39 0.11 0 1
Age 40-44 0.09 0 1
Age 45-51 0.09 0 1
Age 52+ 0.09 0 1
Has family responsibilities 0.27 0 1
Former job type:
degree, technical 6.1 0 1
assistant technician or skilled clerical 7.5 0 1
semi-skilled clerical 3.2 0 1
unskilled clerical 4.8 0 1
skilled production 31.9 0 1
semi-skilled production 18.0 0 1
unskilled production 28.6 0 1
Entered UI from a job with a fixed-term contract 0.82 0 1
Gross replacement rate, months 1-6 of spell 0.78 0.10 0.06 1.15
Gross replacement rate, months 7-12 of spell 0.67 0.15 0.06 1.15
Gross replacement rate, months 13+ of spell 0.65 0.16 0.04 1.15
Net replacement rate, months 1-6 of spell 0.92 0.09 0.12 1.22
Net replacement rate, months 7-12 of spell 0.79 0.14 0.12 1.22
Net replacement rate, months 13+ of spell 0.75 0.14 0.07 1.22
Net earnings in former job (Pesetas per month,
after tax, Feb 87 prices)
74032 25128 33746 653434
UI benefit  (Pesetas per month, Feb 87 prices)
 a 62715 16019 41310 108520
log(net earnings in former job) 11.2 0.29 10.4 13.4
log(UI benefit)
 a 11.0 0.24 10.6 11.6
Quarterly regional unemployment rate (%) 
a 17.4 5.8 7.3 34.2
Quarterly GDP growth rate (%) 
a, b 0.81 0.45 -0.55 1.6
Number of spells = 329,947; 2,397,685 spell months at risk of exit from UI to a job.  
a :
time-varying covariate (statistics derived from person-month file). All variables derived
directly from SIPRE data, except  
b: quarterly regional unemployment rates (source:
Labour Force Survey, EPA), quarterly GDP growth rates (National Accounts), and tax
liabilities on earnings to give net rather than gross earnings (authors’ estimates).26
Table 4.  Cumulative proportion of UI recipients who left UI to a job
after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months (Kaplan-Meier estimates), by subgroup
Months since UI entry
61 2 1 8 2 4
All 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.48
UI entry cohort
February 1987 0.27 0.37 0.44 0.48
June 1987 0.25 0.36 0.42 0.47
November 1987 0.27 0.40 0.47 0.51
February 1988 0.28 0.39 0.46 0.50
June 1988 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.49
November 1988 0.29 0.41 0.46 0.50
February 1989 0.28 0.39 0.45 0.48
June 1989 0.25 0.36 0.42 0.46
November 1989 0.26 0.39 0.46 0.49
February 1990 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.48
June 1990 0.24 0.36 0.43 0.46
November 1990 0.24 0.38 0.45 0.48
February 1991 0.23 0.36 0.45 0.48
June 1991 0.20 0.36 0.45 0.47
November 1991 0.20 0.40 0.45 0.46
Age at UI entry
Less than 25 years 0.30 0.47 0.56 0.60
25-29 0.27 0.41 0.49 0.53
30-34 0.24 0.38 0.45 0.49
35-39 0.24 0.36 0.42 0.45
40-44 0.24 0.36 0.43 0.46
45-51 0.23 0.35 0.42 0.47
52+ 0.15 0.22 0.27 0.29
Lives in Andalucía or Extremadura 0.22 0.35 0.42 0.46
Lives outside Andalucía and Extremadura 0.26 0.39 0.45 0.49
Has family responsibilities 0.25 0.37 0.43 0.47
Without family responsibilities 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.48
Entered UI from job with fixed-term contract 0.28 0.45 0.54 0.59
Entered UI from job with permanent contract 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.30
Former job type:
Degree, technical 0.22 0.32 0.37 0.41
Assistant technician or skilled clerical 0.19 0.28 0.34 0.38
Semi-skilled clerical 0.27 0.42 0.49 0.53
Unskilled clerical 0.23 0.37 0.45 0.49
Skilled production 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.48
Semi-skilled production 0.26 0.39 0.46 0.49
Unskilled production 0.26 0.42 0.51 0.55
Net replacement rate, months 1-6 of spell, > 90% 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.49
Net replacement rate, months 1-6 of spell, < 90% 0.25 0.37 0.43 0.4627
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard function for time-to-UI-exhaustion
Note: vertical lines through points show 95% confidence interval for monthly hazard.
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Table 5.  Logistic hazard regression models of re-employment probability
Model 1 Model 2
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e. )
Aged 25-29 -0.064 (0.010) -0.058 (0.010)
Aged 30-34 -0.137 (0.012) -0.132 (0.012)
Aged 35-39 -0.181 (0.014) -0.174 (0.014)
Aged 40-44 -0.148 (0.015) -0.141 (0.015)
Aged 45-51 -0.122 (0.019) -0.112 (0.019)
Aged 52-59 -0.561 (0.021) -0.556 (0.021)
Has family responsibilities   0.082 (0.008)   0.099 (0.009)
Entered UI from a job with a fixed-term contract   0.756 (0.011)   0.763 (0.011)
Log(regional unemployment rate) -0.079 (0.020)   0.007 (0.042)
Former job: degree, technical -0.038 (0.017) -0.024 (0.018)
Former job: assistant technician or skilled clerical -0.162 (0.015) -0.159 (0.015)
Former job: semi-skilled clerical   0.120 (0.020)   0.109 (0.020)
Former job: unskilled clerical -0.071 (0.017) -0.072 (0.017)
Former job: skilled production   0.050 (0.009)   0.062 (0.009)
Former job: semi-skilled production   0.035 (0.011)   0.024 (0.011)
Log(real UI benefit)
 a -0.093 (0.041) -0.157 (0.042)
Lives in South * log(real UI benefit)
 a, b -0.021 (0.001)   0.184 (0.041)
Log(real earnings in former job)   0.141 (0.035)   0.098 (0.035)
Aged 45-64 * (spell month after April 1989)
 a -0.068 (0.020) -0.065 (0.020)
Spring quarter
 a   0.226 (0.010)   0.223 (0.010)
Summer quarter
 a   0.029 (0.010)   0.032 (0.010)
Autumn quarter
 a -0.053 (0.012) -0.048 (0.012)
Year is 1988
 a   0.096 (0.017)   0.104 (0.017)
Year is 1989
 a   0.055 (0.016)   0.077 (0.017)
Year is 1990
 a -0.002 (0.026)   0.027 (0.027)
Year is 1991
 a -0.122 (0.031) -0.090 (0.032)
Year is 1992
 a   0.022 (0.045)   0.047 (0.045)
Year is 1993
 a -1.189 (0.124) -1.189 (0.124)
Quarterly GDP growth rate (%)
a   0.076 (0.028)   0.078 (0.028)
Linear spline in time-to-exhaustion
month 0 -0.010 (0.018) -0.011 (0.018)
month 1 -0.067 (0.018) -0.069 (0.018)
months 2-3   0.039 (0.009)   0.037 (0.009)
months 4-5 -0.070 (0.009) -0.071 (0.009)
months 6-11 -0.016 (0.003) -0.016 (0.003)
months 12-17 -0.014 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004)
Months 18+   0.024 (0.006)   0.024 (0.006)
Regional fixed effects No Yes
Log-likelihood -363533 -362626
Number of spells = 329,947 (2,397,685 spell-months). 
a: time-varying covariate. Reference categories: aged <
25 years, lives in Madrid region, no family responsibilities, former job type was unskilled production, had a
permanent contract, spell month in Winter 1987.  ‘South’ refers to Andalucía and Extremadura.  Monthly
duration dependence parameters and regional fixed effects shown in Appendix Table 5A.29
Figure 4.  Time-to-exhaustion hazard rate (Model 2 estimates)
Graphs refer to man aged 30 with no family responsibilities, living in Madrid, former job
type was unskilled production with a fixed-term contract, regional unemployment rate = 18%,
GDP growth rate = 0.81%, spell month in Winter 1987. Log(former earnings) and log(UI
benefits) set at sample mean values. Entered UI eligible for 24 months UI in total.
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Figure 6.  Total hazard rate (Model 2 estimates)
Graph refers to man aged 30 with no family responsibilities, living in Madrid, former job
type was unskilled production with a fixed-term contract, regional unemployment rate = 18%,
GDP growth rate = 0.81%, spell month in Winter 1987. Log(former earnings) and log(UI
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Table 6. Logistic hazard regression models of re-employment probability, with
the UI benefit effect varying with elapsed duration
Model 3 Model 4
Spell month Coeff (s.e.) Spell months coeff (s.e.)
1   0.157 (0.118)
2   0.449 (0.101) 1-3   0.183 (0.061)
3 -0.032 (0.096)
4 -0.409 (0.123)
5 -0.507 (0.134) 4-6 -0.328 (0.078)
6 -0.015 (0.144)
7 -0.809 (0.203)
8 -0.733 (0.204) 7-9 -0.790 (0.122)
9 -0.839 (0.226)
10 -0.736 (0.266)
11 -0.683 (0.271) 10-12 -0.594 (0.156)
12 -0.361 (0.270)
13 -0.841 (0.329)
14 -0.603 (0.355) 13-15 -0.765 (0.201)
15 -0.851 (0.364)
16 -0.417 (0.428)
17 -0.928 (0.445) 16-18 -0.524 (0.258)
18 -0.197 (0.473)
19 -0.204 (0.630)
20   0.267 (0.575) 19-21   0.164 (0.357)
21   0.405 (0.656)
22   0.203 (0.780)
23 -0.682 (0.735) 22-24   0.001 (0.432)
24   0.459 (0.728)
Log likelihood -362446 -362486
Table shows estimates of duration-specific coefficients on log(real UI benefits).
Model also includes covariates used in Model 2 (Table 5), plus interactions between
duration and log(earnings): estimates are shown in Table 6A. Number of spells =
329,947 (2,397,685 spell-months).32
Table 7. Logistic hazard regression model of re-employment probability, with the UI
benefit effect varying with elapsed duration and age group
Model 5








1-3   0.242 (0.087) 1-3   0.078 (0.082) 1-3 0.437 (0.235)
4-6 -0.481 (0.112) 4-6 -0.316 (0.100) 4-6 0.404 (0.273)
7-9 -0.813 (0.171) 7-9 -0.734 (0.157) 7-9 -1.198 (0.369)
10-12 -0.775 (0.224) 10-12 -0.412 (0.198) 10-12 -0.661 (0.437)
13-15 -0.635 (0.257) 13-15 -0.561 (0.259) 13-15 -1.864 (0.514)
16-18 -0.856 (0.359) 16-18   0.027 (0.317) 16-18 -1.557 (0.634)
19-21   0.029 (0.583) 19-21   0.455 (0.420) 19-21 -0.814 (0.776)
22-24   0.011 (0.839) 22-24   0.032 (0.504) 22-24 -0.543 (0.837)
Log likelihood = -362324
Table shows estimates of duration-specific coefficients on log(real UI benefits) separately
for each age group.  Model also includes covariates used in Model 2 (Table 5), plus
interactions between duration, age group, and log(earnings): estimates are shown in Table
7A. Number of spells = 329,947 (2,397,685 spell-months).33
APPENDIX
Figure 2A.  Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard function for exits from UI to a job, by
cohort of entry to UI







Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt














Months of UI receipt







Table 5A.  Table 5 continued (Logistic hazard regression models of re-
employment probability for men)
Model 1 Model 2
coeff. (s.e.) Coeff. (s.e.)
Spell month (γt)
1 -4.226 (0.212) -3.150 (0.253)
2 -3.865 (0.211) -2.786 (0.252)
3 -3.741 (0.211) -2.663 (0.252)
4 -3.608 (0.212) -2.531 (0.253)
5 -3.768 (0.212) -2.692 (0.253)
6 -3.814 (0.211) -2.737 (0.252)
7 -3.974 (0.209) -2.897 (0.251)
8 -3.869 (0.210) -2.797 (0.252)
9 -4.019 (0.210) -2.947 (0.251)
10 -4.178 (0.210) -3.104 (0.252)
11 -4.216 (0.210) -3.141 (0.251)
12 -4.136 (0.210) -3.064 (0.252)
13 -4.174 (0.210) -3.108 (0.251)
14 -4.445 (0.209) -3.377 (0.250)
15 -4.422 (0.209) -3.355 (0.251)
16 -4.546 (0.211) -3.481 (0.252)
17 -4.601 (0.211) -3.540 (0.252)
18 -4.746 (0.211) -3.684 (0.252)
19 -4.980 (0.213) -3.920 (0.254)
20 -4.748 (0.214) -3.693 (0.254)
21 -4.962 (0.214) -3.909 (0.255)
22 -5.049 (0.218) -3.998 (0.258)
23 -4.942 (0.217) -3.891 (0.256)
24 -4.907 (0.216) -3.860 (0.256)







Castilla-La Mancha   0.015 (0.020)
Castilla-León -0.041 (0.020)
Cataluña -0.293 (0.018)





País Vasco   0.194 (0.027)
La Rioja   0.223 (0.045)
Table shows the estimates of the duration dependence parameters and
regional fixed effects for models shown in Table 5.37
Table 6A.  Table 6 continued (Logistic hazard regression models of re-employment
probability, with the UI benefit effect varying with elapsed duration)
Model 3 Model 4
coeff (s.e.) coeff (s.e.)
Aged 25-29 -0.064 (0.010) -0.064 (0.010)
Aged 30-34 -0.137 (0.012) -0.137 (0.012)
Aged 35-39 -0.176 (0.014) -0.176 (0.014)
Aged 40-44 -0.140 (0.015) -0.140 (0.015)
Aged 45-51 -0.115 (0.019) -0.115 (0.019)
Aged 52-59 -0.554 (0.021) -0.553 (0.021)
Has family responsibilities   0.101 (0.009)   0.101 (0.009)
Entered UI from a job with a fixed-term
contract
  0.752 (0.011)   0.752 (0.011)
Log(regional unemployment rate)   0.019 (0.042)   0.021 (0.042)
Former job: degree, technical -0.022 (0.018) -0.021 (0.018)
Former job: assistant technician or skilled
clerical
-0.156 (0.015) -0.156 (0.015)
Former job: semi-skilled clerical   0.105 (0.020)   0.105 (0.020)
Former job: unskilled clerical -0.075 (0.017) -0.075 (0.017)
Former job: skilled production   0.057 (0.009)   0.057 (0.009)
Former job: semi-skilled production   0.020 (0.011)   0.020 (0.011)
Aged 45-64 * (spell month after April 1989)
 a -0.059 (0.020) -0.059 (0.020)
Linear spline in time-to-exhaustion
month 0 -0.017 (0.018) -0.013 (0.018)
month 1 -0.065 (0.018) -0.072 (0.018)
months 2-3   0.037 (0.009)   0.039 (0.009)
months 4-5 -0.071 (0.009) -0.071 (0.009)
months 6-11 -0.015 (0.003) -0.015 (0.003)
months 12-17 -0.015 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004)
months 18+   0.011 (0.006)   0.012 (0.006)
Spring quarter
 a   0.225 (0.010)   0.226 (0.010)
Summer quarter
 a   0.032 (0.010)   0.033 (0.010)
Autumn quarter
 a -0.050 (0.012) -0.048 (0.012)
Year is 1988
 a   0.100 (0.017)   0.101 (0.017)
Year is 1989
 a   0.071 (0.017)   0.073 (0.017)
Year is 1990
 a   0.022 (0.027)   0.023 (0.027)
Year is 1991
 a -0.099 (0.032) -0.098 (0.032)
Year is 1992
 a   0.039 (0.045)   0.041 (0.045)
Year is 1993
 a -1.175 (0.124) -1.173 (0.124)
Quarterly GDP growth rate (%)
a   0.075 (0.028)   0.076 (0.028)
Region (Madrid = ref.)
Andalucía -2.163 (0.455) -2.160 (0.455)
Aragón -0.224 (0.025) -0.224 (0.025)
Asturias -0.442 (0.022) -0.442 (0.022)
Baleares -0.073 (0.026) -0.073 (0.026)
Cantabria -0.358 (0.034) -0.359 (0.034)
Canarias   0.015 (0.020)   0.014 (0.020)
Castilla-La Mancha -0.248 (0.015) -0.248 (0.015)
Castilla-León -0.042 (0.020) -0.042 (0.020)38
Cataluña -0.290 (0.018) -0.291 (0.018)
Comunidad Valenciana -0.321 (0.021) -0.321 (0.021)
Extremadura -1.656 (0.457) -1.654 (0.457)
Galicia -0.120 (0.014) -0.119 (0.014)
Murcia -0.057 (0.033) -0.057 (0.033)
Navarra -0.259 (0.021) -0.259 (0.021)
País Vasco   0.187 (0.027)   0.186 (0.027)
La Rioja   0.224 (0.045)   0.224 (0.045)
Spell month (γ t)
1 -7.912 (0.565) -6.058 (0.325)
2 -4.745 (0.477) -5.695 (0.324)
3 -5.277 (0.463) -5.572 (0.324)
4 -2.279 (0.587) -2.105 (0.391)
5 -1.471 (0.636) -2.270 (0.391)
6 -2.943 (0.664) -2.317 (0.390)
7   0.748 (0.874)   0.216 (0.540)
8 -0.746 (0.869)   0.314 (0.540)
9   0.846 (0.965)   0.161 (0.539)
10   0.290 (1.122) -0.044 (0.670)
11 -0.935 (1.141) -0.083 (0.669)
12   0.505 (1.131) -0.007 (0.669)
13   2.581 (1.509)   1.906 (0.930)
14 -0.558 (1.588)   1.633 (0.929)
15   3.211 (1.688)   1.653 (0.929)
16   2.706 (1.954)   1.840 (1.166)
17   2.400 (1.968)   1.779 (1.166)
18 -0.072 (2.096)   1.632 (1.165)
19   1.262 (2.573)   1.427 (1.490)
20   3.775 (2.473)   1.650 (1.489)
21 -0.935 (2.667)   1.431 (1.488)
22   2.508 (3.200) -1.891 (1.687)
23 -2.053 (2.813) -1.787 (1.686)
24 -4.975 (2.787) -1.760 (1.685)
Lives in South * log(real UI benefit)   0.152 (0.041)   0.151 (0.041)
Log(real earnings in former job)*spell month
Month    1   0.214 (0.099)
  2 -0.328 (0.087) 1-3   0.021 (0.051)
  3   0.208 (0.081)
  4   0.324 (0.101)
  5   0.335 (0.110) 4-6   0.228 (0.064)
  6 -0.025 (0.120)
  7   0.411 (0.165)
  8   0.480 (0.165) 7-9   0.440 (0.099)
  9   0.427 (0.183)
10   0.361 (0.215)
11   0.416 (0.218) 10-12   0.252 (0.126)
12 -0.023 (0.219)
13   0.254 (0.246)
14   0.280 (0.268) 13-15   0.240 (0.151)
15   0.184 (0.271)39
16 -0.204 (0.321)
17   0.317 (0.337) 16-18 -0.023 (0.195)
18 -0.189 (0.358)
19 -0.322 (0.493)
20 -0.987 (0.444) 19-21 -0.696 (0.278)
21 -0.719 (0.515)
22 -0.837 (0.613)
23   0.443 (0.586) 22-24 -0.246 (0.344)
24 -0.405 (0.582)
Notes as for Table 5 in main text.40
Table 7A.  Table 7 continued (Logistic hazard regression model of re-employment
probability, with the UI benefit effect varying with elapsed duration and age group)
Model 5
coeff (s.e.)
Aged 25-29 -0.077 (0.010)
Aged 30-34   0.581 (0.391)
Aged 35-39   0.542 (0.391)
Aged 40-44   0.576 (0.391)
Aged 45-51   0.594 (0.391)
Aged 52-59   8.425 (0.748)
Has family responsibilities   0.101 (0.009)
Entered UI from a job with a fixed-term contract   0.736 (0.011)
Log(regional unemployment rate)   0.012 (0.042)
Former job: degree, technical -0.022 (0.018)
Former job: assistant technician or skilled clerical -0.157 (0.015)
Former job: semi-skilled clerical   0.102 (0.020)
Former job: unskilled clerical -0.077 (0.017)
Former job: skilled production   0.057 (0.009)
Former job: semi-skilled production   0.020 (0.011)
Aged 45-64 * (spell month after April 1989)
 a -0.048 (0.020)
Linear spline in time-to-exhaustion
month 0 -0.013 (0.018)
month 1 -0.071 (0.018)
months 2-3   0.039 (0.009)
months 4-5 -0.071 (0.009)
months 6-11 -0.015 (0.003)
months 12-17 -0.015 (0.004)
months 18+   0.012 (0.006)
Spring quarter
 a   0.225 (0.010)
Summer quarter
 a   0.032 (0.010)
Autumn quarter
 a -0.049 (0.012)
Year is 1988
 a   0.103 (0.017)
Year is 1989
 a   0.073 (0.017)
Year is 1990
 a   0.023 (0.027)
Year is 1991
 a -0.099 (0.032)
Year is 1992
 a   0.038 (0.045)
Year is 1993
 a -1.175 (0.124)
Quarterly GDP growth rate (%)
a   0.079 (0.028)






Canarias   0.017 (0.020)
Castilla-La Mancha -0.249 (0.015)
Castilla-León -0.045 (0.020)
Cataluña -0.290 (0.018)





País Vasco   0.187 (0.027)
La Rioja   0.220 (0.045)
Spell month (γ t)
  1 -6.836 (0.390)
  2 -6.473 (0.390)
  3 -6.349 (0.390)
  4 -3.165 (0.456)
  5 -3.328 (0.456)
  6 -3.375 (0.455)
  7 -0.820 (0.603)
  8 -0.722 (0.604)
















Lives in South * log(real UI benefit)   0.142 (0.041)
Log(real earnings in former job)*spell month*
duration
Age <30; months   1-3   0.035 (0.075)
Age <30; months   4-6   0.480 (0.099)
Age <30; months   7-9   0.558 (0.151)
Age <30; months 10-12   0.588 (0.200)
Age <30; months 13-15   0.310 (0.219)
Age <30; months 16-18   0.505 (0.316)
Age <30; months 19-21 -0.393 (0.533)
Age <30; months  22-24 -0.150 (0.788)
Age 30-51; months   1-3   0.134 (0.073)
Age 30-51; months   4-6   0.249 (0.088)
Age 30-51; months   7-9   0.417 (0.137)
Age 30-51; months 10-12   0.159 (0.173)
Age 30-51; months 13-15   0.158 (0.215)
Age 30-51; months 16-18 -0.432 (0.260)
Age 30-51; months 19-21 -0.879 (0.348)
Age 30-51; months  22-24 -0.225 (0.423)42
Age 52-59; months   1-3 -0.962 (0.219)
Age 52-59; months   4-6 -1.203 (0.256)
Age 52-59; months   7-9   0.128 (0.344)
Age 52-59; months 10-12 -0.340 (0.411)
Age 52-59; months 13-15   0.699 (0.474)
Age 52-59; months 16-18   0.374 (0.587)
Age 52-59; months 19-21 -0.377 (0.719)
Age 52-59; months  22-24 -0.397 (0.771)
Notes as for Table 5 in main text.